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ABSTRACT Bilinear pairing, an essential tool to construct-efficient digital signatures, has applications
in mobile devices and other applications. One particular research challenge is to design cross-platform
security protocols (e.g. Windows, Linux, and other popular mobile operating systems) while achieving
an optimal security-performance tradeoff. That is, how to choose the right digital signature algorithm, for
example, on mobile devices while considering the limitations on both computation capacity and battery life.
In this paper, we examine the security-performance tradeoff of four popular digital signature algorithms,
namely: CC (proposed by Cha and Cheon in 2003), Hess (proposed by Hess in 2002), BLMQ (proposed
by Barreto et al. in 2005), and PS (proposed by Paterson and Schuldt in 2006), on various platforms.
We empirically evaluate their performance using experiments on Windows, Android, and Linux platforms,
and find that BLMQ algorithm has the highest computational efficiency and communication efficiency.
We also study their security properties under the random oracle model and assuming the intractability of
the CDH problem, we reveal that the BLMQ digital signature scheme satisfies the property of existential
unforgeable on adaptively chosen message and ID attack. The efficiency of PS algorithm is lower, but it is
secure under the standard model.
INDEX TERMS Identity-based signature, pairing-based signature, Windows, Linux, Android.
I. INTRODUCTION
The U.S. government issued the first electronic signature
law in the world on June 20, 2000, and several years later
(i.e. April 1, 2005), the government of China officially
issued and implemented ‘‘electronic signature law of the
People’s Republic of China’’, and article 14th explic-
itly stipulates that ‘‘reliable electronic signatures have the
same legal effects with handwritten signatures or seals’’.
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FIGURE 1. A typical identity-based digital signature algorithm.
Electronic signatures are also increasingly commonly used
in our society (e.g. online shopping transactions using our
mobile devices and applications), with security protocols
such as digital schemes playing an important role [1]–[3].
Earlier digital signature algorithms are mostly based on
public key cryptography [4]–[7], where a user’s public
key needs to be validated by a CA (Certificate Authority)
[8]–[11]. In 1984, Shamir [12] proposed the concept of
the cryptosystem based on identity, which simplified key
management [13], [14]. Specifically, it uses bilinear pairing
to solve the discrete logarithm problem on elliptic curves.
In 2000, Joux [15] proposed bilinear pairing for the iden-
tity based cryptosystem, and a year later, Boneh proposed
a short signature system based on bilinear pairing. Bilinear
pairing (e.g. Weil pairing and Tate pairing) allows one to
construct more efficient cryptographic protocols. An identity-
based signature algorithm generally includes the following
four steps, as shown in Figure 1.
1) System set up
A trusted Private Key Generater (PKG) performs this
algorithm, which receives parameter 1k (k is a safety
parameter) as the input. The corresponding output will
be the master key s and system parameter params. PKG
keeps s secret, and makes params publicly available.
2) Key extract
PKG executes this algorithm to generate the user’s key.
Given IDU (i.e. user’s identity) as the input, and the
PKG calculates the user’s private key SU , and sends it
to the user in a secure manner.
3) Sign
Upon input the system parameter params, user’s iden-
tity IDU , message m to be signed, and private key SU ;
the corresponding output is the signature σ .
4) Verify
Upon input the system parameter params, user’s
identity IDU , message m, and signature σ ; the corre-
sponding output is 1/0, which represents whether the
signature σ is valid for the message m and the user’s
identity IDU .
Despite the increasing role of digital signatures in our
society and the increasing number of digital signatures pro-
posed in the literature, there has been no prior attempt
to objectively examine digital signature algorithms and
evaluate them for their suitability for different operating
systems (e.g. Windows, Linux and Android), particularly
using implementations [16]–[18].
In this research, we evaluate four popular digital signature
algorithms, namely: CC (proposed by Cha and Cheon [26]
in 2003), Hess (proposed by Hess [27] in 2002), BLMQ
(proposed by Barreto et al. [28] in 2005), and PS (proposed
by Paterson and Schuldt [29] in 2006), using implementa-
tions on the PBC Library. Specifically, we measure their
computation and communication costs across four different
platforms: Windows, Android, and Linux. Then, we evaluate
their security.
In the next section, we revisit the four digital signature
algorithms.
II. REVISITING THE FOUR ALGORITHMS
A. CC ALGORITHM
The CC digital signature algorithm [26] consists of the fol-
lowing four steps.
1) System set up
Sets G1 to be a cyclic addition group generated by p,
and the order is p. Sets GT to be a cyclic multiplication
group with the same order p. Sets e : G1 × G1 → GT
to be a bilinear pairing. Defines two secure Hash func-
tions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 → Z∗p .
PKG generates a master key s ∈ Z∗p , and calculates
Ppub = sP. PKG opens system parameters {G1, GT , p,
e, P, Ppub, H1, H2}, and keeps the master key s secret.
2) Key extract
(1) Gives user U an identity IDU .
(2) PFG calculates the user’s private key SU = sQU .
Thus, QU = H1(IDU ) is the user’s public key.
3) Sign
(1) Selects r ∈ Z∗p randomly.
(2) Calculates V = rQU , h = H2(m,V ) and W =
(r + h)SU .
(3) The signature of the message m is σ = (V ,W ).
4) Verify
The verifier calculates h = H2(m,V ), and verifies
whether the equation e(P,W ) = e(Ppub,V + hQU )
is correct in order to verify if the signature σ is the
legitimate signature of messagem and the identity IDU .
If the verification is successful, then the signature is
valid. Otherwise, the signature is invalid.
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B. HESS ALGORITHM
The Hess digital signature algorithm [27] consists of the
following steps.
1) System set up
Sets G1 to be a cyclic addition group generated by p,
and the order is p. Sets GT to be a cyclic multiplication
group with the same order p. Sets e : G1 × G1 → GT
to be a bilinear pairing. Defines two secure Hash func-
tions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → G1 and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × G1 → Z∗p .
PKG generates a master key s ∈ Z∗p , and calculates
Ppub = sP. PKG opens system parameters {G1, GT , p,
e, P, Ppub, H1, H2}, and keeps the master key s secret.
2) Key extract
(1) Gives user U an identity IDU .
(2) PKG calculates the user’s private key SU = sQU .
Thus, QU = H1(IDU ) is the user’s public key.
3) Sign
(1) Selects r ∈ Z∗p and P1 ∈ G∗1 randomly.
(2) Calculates T = (P1,P)r .
(3) Calculates h = H2(m,T ).
(4) Calculates W = rP1 + hSU .
(5) The signature of the message m is σ = (h,W ).
4) Verify
The verifier calculates T = e(W ,P)e(QU ,−Ppub)h to
verify if the signature σ is a legitimate signature of the
messagem and the identity IDU . After that, determines
whether the equation h = H2(m,T ) is correct. If yes,
then the signature σ is valid, and outputs 1. Otherwise,
the signature σ is invalid, and outputs 0.
C. BLMQ ALGORITHM
The BLMQ digital signature algorithm [28] consists of the
following four steps.
1) System set up
Sets G1 to be a cyclic addition group generated by
p > 2k (k is a safe parameter.), and the order is p. Sets
GT to be a cyclic multiplication group with the same
order p. Sets e : G1×G1→ GT to be a bilinear pairing.
Defines two secure Hash functions H1 : {0, 1}∗ → Zp
and H2 : {0, 1}∗ × GT → Z∗p . PKG generates a master
key s ∈ Z∗p , and calculates Ppub = sP. Sets g = e(p, p).
PKG opens system parameters {G1, GT , p, e, P, Ppub,
g, H1, H2}, and keeps the master key s secret.
2) Key extract
(1) Gives user U an identity IDU .
(2) PKG calculates user’s private key SU =
1
H1(IDU )+sP.
3) Sign
(1) Selects r ∈ Z∗p randomly.
(2) Calculates x = gr .
(3) Calculates h = H2(m, x) and V = (r + h)SU .
(4) The signature of the message m is σ = (h,V ).
4) Verify
To verify if the signature σ is a valid signature of
the message m and the identity IDU , the verifier
checks if
h = H2(m, e(V ,H1(IDU )P+ Ppub)g−h)
is correct. If yes, then it is determined that sigma is valid
and 1 is given as the output; otherwise, the signature is
invalid.
D. PS ALGORITHM
The PS algorithm [29] is the result of modifying Waters’
encryption scheme. In the PS system, the length of the iden-
tity and the message is nu bits and nm bits. In order to con-
struct a more flexible signature system, we can use two Hash
function H1 : {0, 1}∗→ (0, 1)nu and H2 : {0, 1}∗→ (0, 1)nm .
Map any length of identity and message to a bit string with
specified length. The PS digital signature system consists of
the following four steps.
1) System set up
Sets G1 to be a cyclic addition group generated by P,
and the order is p. Sets GT to be a cyclic multiplication
group with the same order p. e : G1 × G1 → GT is
a bilinear pairing. PKG selects a master key s ∈ Z∗p
randomly. Calculates P1 = sP. PKG selects P2 ∈ G1,
u′,m′ ∈ G1, vector U = (ui) and M = (mi) randomly.
The lengths of U and M are respectively nu and nm.
PKG opens system parameters {G1, GT , nu, nm, p, e,
P,P1, P2, u′, U , m′, M}, and keeps the master key s
secret.
2) Key extract
Gives the user U an identity IDU . u[i] represents the ith
bit of IDU . µ ∈ {1, · · · , nu} is a set of i that satisfies
u[i] = 1. In other words, if the ith bit of IDU is 1, then
add i to the set µ. Otherwise, do nothing. PKG chooses
r ∈ Zp randomly, and calculates U ’s private key SU =
(S1, S2) = (sP2 + r(u′ +∑i∈u ui), rP).
3) Sign
m[j] represents the jth bit of the messages m. M ⊆
{1, · · · , nm} represents a set of j that satisfies m[j] = 1.
To sign a message m, the signer first selects r ′ = Zp
randomly, and then calculates σ = (V ,W ,Z ) = (sP2+
r(r ′ +∑i∈u ui)+ r ′(m′ +∑j∈M mj), rP, r ′P).
4) Verify
To verify whether the signature σ is a valid signature
of message m and the identity IDU , the verifier checks
if
e(V ,P) = e(P2,P1)e(u′ +
∑
i∈u
ui,W )e(m′ +
∑
j∈M
mj,Z )
holds. If yes, then σ is valid and 1 is given as the
output; otherwise, the signature is not validate and
outputs 0.
III. PERFORMANCE AND SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the performance and security of
the four digital signature algorithms.
37852 VOLUME 6, 2018
S. Zhong et al.: Performance and Security Evaluations of Identity- and Pairing-Based Digital Signature Algorithms
TABLE 1. Performance cost comparison.
FIGURE 2. Performance of CC under Windows, Android, and Linux.
A. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON: COMMUNICATION
COST
1) CC digital signature algorithm
At the signing phase, it performs two point multipli-
cation operations in G1. At the verify phase, it per-
forms one add operation and one point multiplication
operation in G1, and two pairing operations. Thus,
the communication cost is 2|G1|.
2) Hess digital signature algorithm
At the signing phase, it performs one add operation
and two point multiplication operations in G1, one
exponential operation in GT and one pairing operation.
At the verify phase, it performs one exponential oper-
ation and one point multiplication operation in GT and
two pairing operations. Thus, the communication cost
is |G1| + |Zp|.
3) BLMQ digital signature algorithm
At the signing phase, it performs one point multiplica-
tion operation in G1 and one exponential operation in
GT . At the verify phase, it performs one add operation,
one point multiplication operation in G1, one exponen-
tial operation and point multiplication operation in GT
and one pairing operation. Thus, the communication
cost is |G1| + |Zp|, which is the same as of Hess
algorithm.
4) PS digital signature algorithm At the sign phase, there
are nu+nm2 + 1 times add operations and two point
multiplication operations inG1 because there is no limit
to the numbers of users’ ID and the messages to be
signed. At the verify phase, there are nu+nm2 times add
operations in G1, two multiplication operations in GT
and four pairing operations. Thus, the communication
cost is 3|G1|.
Table 1 gives the summary of theoretic performance anal-
ysis of four algorithms.
B. PERFORMANCE ACROSS THREE PLATFORMS
Figures 2 to 5 present the performance comparison of the four
algorithms under three different operating systems, namely:
Windows, Android, and Linux.
From the figures, it is clear that the efficiency of the four
algorithms on Android is much lower than that on Windows.
There are two main reasons for this. One is that Android on
mobile is less efficient than Windows on a conventional and
more powerful computer, and the other reason is that Java
language is less efficient than C language.
1) We also remark that the CPU of an Android (mobile)
device generally requires lower power consumption,
and the ARM CPU is often used. Thus, the number of
instruction sets inside an ARMCPU is less than a com-
puter with an Intel X86 CPU. Also, even for CPUs with
the same frequency, there are differences in the perfor-
mance capability between different floating point oper-
ations, ranging from thousands to tens of thousands of
times. An Android device’s GPU is usually integrated
with the CPU at the same SoC (system on chip), which
is equal to Intel HD Graphics. The computers that we
used for the evaluations have discrete graphics. While
bothmobile devices and computers are bothmulti-core,
multiple CPUs on mobile devices are used to deal with
different things and a computer’s multi-core processor
refers to centralized multiple core computations on
VOLUME 6, 2018 37853
S. Zhong et al.: Performance and Security Evaluations of Identity- and Pairing-Based Digital Signature Algorithms
FIGURE 3. Performance of Hess under Windows, Android, and Linux.
FIGURE 4. Performance of BLMQ under Windows, Android, and Linux.
FIGURE 5. Performance of PS under Windows, Android, and Linux.
a CPU, and deals with the same thing by cooperating
with each other (i.e. parallel processing).
2) C language is compiler language. At compile time,
the file written in compiler language is compiled into
machine language, which is time consuming. However
it is very fast when it is running. Java, on the other hand,
is an interpretive language. At compile time, it trans-
forms the file written in Java into Java byte code. Java
byte code is performed by Java virtual machine (JVM).
However, JVM is implemented in C language, which
means that there is another intermediate layer. Interpre-
tation of a program is very slow. Sometimes, the high-
level language’s interpretation of a source program
is 100 times slower than the machine code program.
In addition, some mechanisms of JVM are time con-
suming (e.g. garbage collection, and library search
and loading). However, in our evaluations, we did not
include the compilation process.
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FIGURE 6. Performance of the four signature algorithms on each phase.
We also observed that the first three phases of the four algo-
rithms on Linux require more time than those on Windows.
Linux and Windows are both full multitasking operating
systems. But as we know, Linux is faster than Windows.
When Windows is installed, it also installs many other com-
ponents and services; thus, the system becomes bloated.
Whereas when Linux is installed, it only installs basic soft-
ware and services. When running the same program, the CPU
usage of Linux is higher than that of Windows. So under
the same hardware conditions, Linux is more efficient than
Windows. But as shown in Figures 2 to 5, the efficiency
of Linux on the first three phases of the four algorithms is
lower than that of Windows. It is due to the need to use the
rand function. On Windows, the maximum value that can be
returned by the rand function is 32767. However on Linux,
the largest number that can be returned by the rand function
is 2147483647. In other words, the number of their internal
loops and the magnitude of their calculations are different.
Now let’s analyze the differences of the four algorithms
in the same phase, say on Windows. Figure 6 presents the
performance of the four signature algorithms on each phase.
We can see that the PS algorithm requires a much longer time
than the other three algorithms on the setup phase, with CC,
Hess and BLMQ have almost the same time cost. On the
extract phase, both CC and Hess algorithms require the most
time cost, and the BLMQ algorithms have the lowest time
cost. On the sign phase, BLMQ has the lowest time cost.
On the verify phase, PS has the most time cost. In general,
the PS algorithm has the lowest efficiency, mainly due to the
time costs incurred during Setup and Verify phases. BLMQ
appears to have the highest efficiency on all phases.
As for communication efficiency, it is system-independent
and only relevant to algorithms. Figure 7 shows the commu-
nication costs for each algorithm, which suggests that both
BLMQ and Hess algorithms have the lowest communication
costs.
FIGURE 7. Communication cost comparison of the four signature
algorithms.
C. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In the random oracle model and assuming intractability of
the CDH problem, it is proven that the CC digital signature
algorithm satisfies the property of existential unforgeable on
adaptively chosen message and ID attack.
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From the key extract stage, we know that the user’s
private key is generated by PKG and sent to the user. In other
words, PKG is fully aware of the user’s private key. So in
many cases PKG is assumed to be fully secure and trusted,
by default, which may not be realistic for all applications.
Thus, to introduce an additional layer of security, the user
can randomly select a secret value t ∈ Z∗p in the key extract
stage. After that, the user calculates T = t × Ppub and
QU = H1(IDU , t), and then sends T and IDU to PKG.
PKG simply determines the uniqueness of the user’s identity
information IDU . If IDU is unique, then PKG should calculate
the private key for the user, and sends the private key to the
user. Users no longer need to select random number r ∈ Z∗P ,
but calculate V = t×Ppub, h = H2(m,V ) andW = (t+hSU )
directly. When verifying, verifiers only need to verify that
e(P,W ) = e(V + hPpub,QU ) holds.
Similarly, it was proven that both Hess and BLMQ algo-
rithms satisfy the property of existential unforgeable on adap-
tively chosen message and ID attack, in the random oracle
model and assuming intractability of the CDH problem.
The PS digital signature algorithm was shown to satisfy
the property of existential unforgeable on adaptively chosen
message and ID attack. However, unlike the previous three
algorithms, PS was proven secure under the standard model.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this research, we studied the performance of four popular
digital signature algorithms, and in particular their perfor-
mance on Windows, Linux, and Android, as well as their
security.
Future research includes extending this study to cover a
more comprehensive list of digital signature algorithms.
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